All wars are expensive, but civil wars carry heightened stakes. Defeat can mean loss of territory, the dissolution of the sitting government, or the liquidation of the state itself. Even a victorious government may face tremendous crises and pressures in the short-term. A central bank can signal a sovereign’s creditworthiness to potential lenders, but the bank’s independence (or even existence) can be terminated should a government wish to do so. Despite this, lenders not only continue to lend to governments amidst civil wars but also respond to signals of creditworthiness such as the presence of an independent central bank. Using several statistical models and bond yield data from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, I demonstrate that the presence of a central bank reduces sovereign borrowing costs for a state amidst a civil war. This confirms the institution’s ability to secure cheap wartime capital under suboptimal conditions.

所有的战争都是昂贵的，但是内战却举足轻重。失败可能意味着失去领土，现任政府的解散或国家本身的清算。即使是胜利的政府也可能在短期内面临巨大的危​​机和压力。中央银行可以向潜在的贷方表明主权国家的信誉，但是如果政府愿意的话，可以终止该银行的独立性（甚至存在）。尽管如此，在内战期间，贷方不仅继续向政府提供贷款，而且还对诸如建立独立中央银行之类的信誉信号做出反应。我使用19世纪和20世纪初的几种统计模型和债券收益率数据，证明了中央银行的存在减少了内战期间国家的主权借贷成本。