For all the complexities of India’s politics, Prime Minister Narendra Modi seemed to have his economic path cut out for him. His ‘Achche din aane waale hein’ (good days are coming) campaign, which had won him a resounding election victory in 2014 for his first term, suggested that Modi’s primary goal was growth and development for his country and people, and hence also an agenda of economic reform. Focusing specifically on India’s negotiations in the context of the WTO, I show in this paper that India has continued to hold on to its former trade policy priorities and negotiation positions and adopted even more hard-line positions in some cases. Interestingly though, the same policy priorities and negotiation patterns that had ill-served India in the past may now no longer be a liability. This is only in part a credit to the Modi administration per se. Rather, it is mainly due to the rise of the phenomenon of “weaponized interdependence”, which in turn legitimizes—sometimes even necessitates—the securitization of foreign economic policy, and more specifically, trade politics. Taken in this changing context and as other countries also adopt a more market-cautionary approach, India’s historic and oft-reviled trade scepticism and reluctance to integrate in global value chains may yet allow it to have the last rhetorical laugh.

由于印度政治的所有复杂性，总理纳伦德拉·莫迪（Narendra Modi）似乎为他切断了经济之路。他的“ Achche din aane waale hein”（好日子即将到来）竞选活动为他赢得了2014年首届选举的巨大胜利，这表明莫迪的主要目标是他的国家和人民的成长与发展，因此也是经济改革议程。我在本文中特别关注印度在世贸组织背景下的谈判，印度表明印度将继续坚持其先前的贸易政策重点和谈判立场，在某些情况下甚至会采用更强硬的立场。不过，有趣的是，过去不适用于印度的相同政策重点和谈判模式现在可能不再是责任。这仅部分归功于Modi政府本身。相反，这主要是由于“武器化的相互依存”现象的出现，反过来又使外国经济政策（特别是贸易政治）的证券化合法化了（有时甚至是必要的）。在这种变化的背景下，由于其他国家也采取了更加谨慎的市场态度，印度对贸易的历史性和反复无常的怀疑以及不愿融入全球价值链的态度可能仍使印度笑到最后。