This paper empirically examines the linkage between ownership pattern, board composition and earnings management of Indian firms using the system Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM) by considering panel data 364 non-financial firms from 2017 to 2019, comprising of 1092 firm-year observations. The study also uses Pooled OLS and Fixed Effects model to compare the results with the system GMM in examining board composition–earnings management relation. The study reveals that board independence and diligence of independent directors do not play any role in curbing earnings management. Also, busy independent directors and persons with multiple directorships are not necessarily useful in arresting earnings management. However, earnings management practice is more prevalent in firms where the same person enjoys the power of a CEO as well as chairman. An increase in promoters' shareholding also leads to an increase in earnings management. While earnings management is not influenced by FII shareholding, it increases with the increase in DII shareholding. This study is important for several reasons. First, since this study considers the period after the implementation of a new financial reporting system in India (popularly known as IND-AS), the findings of this study reflect the earnings management behavior of Indian firms in light of new financial reporting practices. Second, the study considers the period when significant governance initiatives are taken after the implementation of the New Companies Act, 2013. This study contributes to the literature by addressing the recent governance norms and aligning the relevant policy implications accordingly. The findings of this study reveal a clear understanding as to which board level and governance parameters are useful in constraining earnings management and disclosing quality earnings by companies in an emerging market context. The outcomes are also explained further for relevant policy implications. Board of directors, managers, investors, regulators, and policymakers can find these outcomes useful for making critical governance-related decisions. Finally, the study contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence on what board level and governance parameters are useful in constraining firms' earnings management in an emerging economy under the regime of new financial reporting practices.

本文采用通用矩量法（GMM），通过研究面板数据（2017年至2019年364家非金融企业，包括1092个企业年观察），实证研究了印度公司的所有权模式，董事会组成和盈余管理之间的联系。该研究还使用汇总OLS和固定效应模型将结果与系统GMM进行比较，以检查董事会组成与盈余管理之间的关系。该研究表明，董事会的独立性和独立董事的勤奋在抑制盈余管理方面没有任何作用。同样，忙碌的独立董事和具有多个董事职位的人员不一定对阻止盈余管理有用。但是，在同一人同时享有首席执行官和董事长权力的公司中，盈余管理实践更为普遍。发起人持股量的增加也导致收益管理的增加。尽管盈余管理不受FII持股的影响，但随着DII持股的增加而增加。这项研究很重要，原因有几个。首先，由于本研究考虑了在印度实施新的财务报告系统（通常称为IND-AS）之后的时期，因此本研究的结果反映了印度公司根据新的财务报告惯例进行的盈余管理行为。其次，该研究考虑了在实施《 2013年新公司法》之后采取重大治理举措的时期。该研究通过解决最新的治理规范并相应地调整相关政策含义，为文献做出了贡献。这项研究的结果揭示了对哪些董事会级别和治理参数在约束收益管理和披露新兴市场环境中公司的高质量收益方面有用的清晰理解。还针对相关政策含义进一步解释了结果。董事会，经理，投资者，监管机构和政策制定者可以发现这些结果对于制定与治理相关的关键决策非常有用。最后，该研究通过提供证据表明在新的财务报告惯例制度下，哪些董事会级别和治理参数可用于限制新兴经济体中公司的盈余管理，从而为现有文献做出了贡献。