This paper used a small stylized nonlinear three-country macroeconomic model of a monetary union to analyse the interactions between fiscal (governments) and monetary (common central bank) policymakers. The three fiscal players were divided into a financially stable core and a less stable periphery. The periphery itself consisted of two players with different perceptions of the trade-off between fiscal stability and output growth. Using the OPTGAME algorithm, solutions were calculated for two game strategies: one cooperative (Pareto optimal) and one non-cooperative game type (the Nash game for the feedback information pattern). Introducing a negative demand shock, the performance of different coalition options between players were analysed. A higher level of cooperation leads in general to a better overall outcome of the game, however, with highly varying burdens to be borne by the players.

中文翻译：

---

每个国家为自己而中央银行为我们所有人？

本文使用货币联盟的小型程式化非线性三国宏观经济模型来分析财政（政府）和货币（共同中央银行）决策者之间的相互作用。这三个财政参与者被分为财务稳定的核心和不太稳定的外围。外围本身由两个参与者组成，他们对财政稳定和产出增长之间的权衡有着不同的看法。使用 OPTGAME 算法，计算了两种博弈策略的解决方案：一种合作（帕累托最优）和一种非合作博弈类型（反馈信息模式的纳什博弈）。引入负面需求冲击，分析了参与者之间不同联盟选项的表现。更高水平的合作通常会导致更好的游戏整体结果，但是，