Sovereign debt crises are difficult to solve. This paper studies the “holdout problem,” meaning the risk that creditors refuse to participate in a debt restructuring. We document a large variation in holdout rates, based on a comprehensive new dataset of 23 bond restructurings with external creditors since 1994. We then study the determinants of holdouts and find that the size of creditor losses (haircuts) is among the best predictors at the bond level. In a restructuring, bonds with higher haircuts see higher holdout rates, and the same is true for small bonds and those issued under foreign law. Collective action clauses (CACs) are effective in reducing holdout risks. However, classic CACs, with bond-by-bond voting, are not sufficient to assure high participation rates. Only the strongest form of CACs, with single-limb aggregate voting, minimizes the holdout problem according to our simulations. The results help to inform theory as well as current policy initiatives on reforming sovereign bond markets.

主权债务危机很难解决。本文研究了“保留问题”，即债权人拒绝参与债务重组的风险。自1994年以来，我们根据23个与外部债权人进行的债券重组的综合新数据集，记录了保留率的巨大差异。然后，我们研究了保留率的决定因素，发现债权人损失（削减）的规模是该机构最佳的预测指标之一。债券水平。在重组中，减价债券的保留率更高，小型债券和根据外国法律发行的债券也是如此。集体行动条款（CAC）可有效降低保留风险。但是，具有逐个表决权的经典CAC不足以确保较高的参与率。只有最强大的CAC形式，具有单边汇总投票，根据我们的模拟，最大程度地减少了保持问题。研究结果有助于为理论以及当前有关改革主权债券市场的政策举措提供信息。