Husserl is known to have oriented many aspects of his extensive analyses of phantasy around a contrast to perception: what phantasy and perception have in common, for example, is their intuitiveness; yet, while in perception something is encountered ‘in the flesh,’ in phantasy this experience is modified by its ‘as if in the flesh’ character. However, both in the majority of Husserl’s reflections on phantasy and in much of the secondary literature on the topic, we find few further details concerning the difference between both modes of intuitiveness: ‘in the flesh’ and ‘as if in the flesh.’ In this paper, I draw on sources from Husserl’s later work in order to get clarification on at least one important point of difference, namely the ways in which individuation and identity, that is, constitutions of individual and identical objects, clearly set apart phantasy from perception. As we will see, this requires an understanding of Husserl’s account of objective time, and of the constitution of individual identical objects with their unique positions in objective time. After an introductory discussion of the meaning and the conditions of individuation in the methodical framework of phenomenology, I will lay out the different levels of the constitution of objective time (1+2). In the second part of the paper, I will try to follow and explore one of Husserl’s arguments that contrasts the constitutional performances involved in the constitution of phantasy objects with the individuation of real objects in objective time (3+4). The textual basis for this discussion is to be found in Husserl’s last book, Experience and Judgement. In what follows, I will begin with a short discussion of the concepts of individuality, individuation, uniqueness and identity, and also ask why these issues may be of special interest for a phenomenologist who is investigating the phenomenon of phantasy.

中文翻译：

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幻想的时代与个体化的界限

众所周知，胡塞尔在他对幻想的广泛分析的许多方面都围绕着与知觉的对比：例如，幻想和知觉的共同点是它们的直觉；然而，虽然在知觉中某些东西是“在肉体中”遇到的，但在幻想中，这种体验被其“仿佛在肉体中”的特征所改变。然而，无论是在胡塞尔对幻想的大部分反思中，还是在关于该主题的许多次要文献中，我们都没有找到关于两种直觉模式之间差异的进一步细节：“在肉体中”和“仿佛在肉体中”。在本文中，我借鉴胡塞尔后期著作的资料，以澄清至少一个重要的不同点，即个体化和同一性的方式，即个体和相同对象的构成，清楚地将幻想与知觉区分开来。正如我们将看到的，这需要理解胡塞尔对客观时间的描述，以及在客观时间中具有独特位置的个体相同对象的构成。在对现象学方法框架中个体化的意义和条件进行介绍性讨论后，我将阐述客观时间（1+2）构成的不同层次。在论文的第二部分，我将尝试遵循和探索胡塞尔的一个论点，它将幻想对象的构成所涉及的构成表现与客观时间（3+4）中真实对象的个体化进行对比。这种讨论的文本基础可以在胡塞尔的最后一本书《经验与判断》中找到。在接下来的内容中，