The concept of basic intrinsic value is important for axiology. Michael Zimmerman and Timothy Perrine each present necessary and sufficient conditions for something’s having basic intrinsic value. I argue that neither account is satisfactory. I present two objections to Zimmerman’s view. First, I argue that his view cannot accommodate some widely held and plausible views about the intrinsic value of knowledge and true belief. Second, I argue that it cannot accommodate some plausible views about the intrinsic value of states when one state occurs in virtue of the other. It cannot handle “clusters” of intrinsically valuable states. In the final section, I explain Perrine’s view and argue that his account also cannot accommodate some plausible views about the value of knowledge and true belief.

基本内在价值的概念对价值论很重要。迈克尔·齐默尔曼（Michael Zimmerman）和蒂莫西·佩里恩（Timothy Perrine）都为具有基本内在价值的事物提供了必要和充分的条件。我认为这两种说法都不令人满意。我对齐默尔曼的观点提出两个反对意见。首先，我认为他的观点不能容纳关于知识和真实信念的内在价值的广泛持有的和合理的观点。第二，我认为，当一个国家由于另一种国家而发生时，它不能容纳一些关于国家内在价值的合理观点。它无法处理具有内在价值的国家的“集群”。在最后一节中，我解释了Perrine的观点，并认为Perrine的论述也无法容纳关于知识和真实信念的价值的一些合理观点。