Are countries especially entitled, if not obliged, to prioritize the interests or well-being of their own citizens during a global crisis, such as a global pandemic? We call this partiality for compatriots in times of crisis “crisis nationalism”. Vaccine nationalism is one vivid example of crisis nationalism during the COVID-19 pandemic; so is the case of the US government’s purchasing a 3-month supply of the global stock of the antiviral Remdesivir for domestic use. Is crisis nationalism justifiable at all, and, if it is, what are its limits? We examine some plausible arguments for national partiality, and conclude that these arguments support crisis nationalism only within strict limits. The different arguments for partiality, as we will note, arrive at these limits for different reasons. But more generally, so we argue, any defensible crisis nationalism must not entail the violation of human rights or the worsening of people’s deprivation. Moreover, we propose that good faith crisis nationalism ought to be sensitive to the potential moral costs of national partiality during a global crisis and must take extra care to control or offset these costs. Thus, crisis nationalism in the form of vaccine nationalism or the hoarding of global supplies of therapeutics during a global pandemic exceeds the bounds of acceptable partiality.

各国是否特别有权（如果没有义务）在全球危机（例如全球大流行）期间优先考虑本国公民的利益或福祉？我们将这种在危机时期对同胞的偏爱称为“危机民族主义”。疫苗民族主义是 COVID-19 大流行期间危机民族主义的一个生动例子；美国政府购买全球抗病毒药物瑞德西韦3个月供国内使用的情况也是如此。危机民族主义是否合理，如果是，它的局限性是什么？我们研究了一些关于民族偏见的合理论据，并得出结论，这些论据仅在严格的范围内支持危机民族​​主义。正如我们将注意到的，关于偏袒的不同论点出于不同的原因达到这些限制。但更一般地说，所以我们认为，任何可以辩护的危机民族主义都不得导致侵犯人权或加剧人们的贫困。此外，我们建议真诚的危机民族主义应该对全球危机期间国家偏见的潜在道德成本敏感，并且必须格外小心地控制或抵消这些成本。因此，以疫苗民族主义形式出现的危机民族主义或在全球大流行期间囤积全球治疗药物供应超出了可接受的偏袒范围。