Paternalistic behaviour directed towards a person’s informed and competent decisions is often thought to be morally impermissible. This view is supported by what we can call the Anti-Paternalism Principle (APP). While APP might seem plausible when employed to show the wrongness of paternalism by the state, there are some cases of paternalistic behaviour between private, informed, and competent individuals where APP seems mistaken. This raises a difficulty for supporters of APP. Either they need to reject APP to accommodate our intuitions in these cases, or provide grounds for thinking that paternalistic behaviour between certain private individuals is different in a morally relevant sense. In this paper, I explore several possible morally relevant differences, and find all of them unsatisfactory as grounds for maintaining the plausibility of APP.

通常认为，针对一个人的明智和有能力的决定的家长式行为在道德上是不允许的。这种观点得到了我们所谓的反家长主义原则（APP）的支持。虽然APP在被国家用来表明家长式服务的错误时似乎是合理的，但是在私人，知情的和有能力的个人之间有一些家长式的行为，其中APP似乎是错误的。这给APP的支持者带来了困难。在这些情况下，他们要么拒绝APP来适应我们的直觉，要么提供理由认为某些私人个体之间的家长式行为在道德相关意义上是不同的。在本文中，我探讨了几种可能在道德上相关的差异，并发现所有这些差异均不能令人满意，可以作为维持APP合理性的依据。