Studies in collective intelligence have shown that suboptimal cognitive traits of individuals can lead a group to succeed in a collective cognitive task, in recent literature this is called mandevillian intelligence. Analogically, as Mandeville has suggested, the moral vices of individuals can sometimes also lead to collective good. I suggest that this mandevillian morality can happen in many ways in collaborative activities. Mandevillian morality presents a challenge for normative virtue theories in ethics. The core of the problem is that mandevillian morality implies that individual vice is, in some cases, valuable. However, normative virtue theories generally see vice as disvaluable. A consequence of this is that virtue theories struggle to account for the good that can emerge in a collective. I argue that normative virtue theories can in fact accommodate for mandevillian emergent good. I put forward three distinctive features that allow a virtue theory to do so: a distinction between individual and group virtues, a distinction between motivational and teleological virtues, and an acknowledgement of the normativity of “vicious” roles in groups.

集体智力的研究表明，个人的最佳认知特征可能导致一个小组成功完成集体认知任务，在最近的文献中，这被称为mandevillian智力。类似地，正如曼德维尔（Mandeville）所建议的那样，个人的道德恶行有时也会导致集体利益。我建议这种mandevillian道德可以在协作活动中以多种方式发生。曼德维尔的道德观念对道德中的规范美德理论提出了挑战。问题的核心是曼德维尔的道德观念在某些情况下意味着个人的罪恶是有价值的。但是，规范美德理论通常认为恶习是不可估量的。这样的结果是，美德理论难以解释可能出现在集体中的利益。我认为规范美德理论实际上可以适应mandevillian的紧急物品。我提出了三个使美德理论能够做到的独特特征：个人美德和团体美德之间的区别，动机美德和目的论美德之间的区别以及对群体中“恶性”角色的规范性的认可。