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Value Invariabilism and Two Distinctions in Value
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice ( IF 1.0 ) Pub Date : 2021-01-04 , DOI: 10.1007/s10677-020-10144-6
Zak A. Kopeikin

Following Moore, value invariabilists deny that the intrinsic value of something can be affected by features extrinsic to it. The primary focuses of this paper are (i) to examine the invariabilistic thesis and expand upon how we ought to understand it, in light of contemporary axiological distinctions, and (ii) to argue that distinguishing between different kinds of invariabilism provides resources to undermine a prominent argument against variabilism. First, I use two contemporary axiological distinctions to clarify what kind of value the invariabilism debate concerns (final value). Then I show how the distinction between personal value and value simpliciter reveals different variabilistic theses, depending on what type of final value one thinks may be affected by extrinsic features. Using this insight, I challenge an argument for final value simpliciter invariabilism. Variabilists offer the example of the vicious being pleased as a counterexample to the claim that pleasure’s final value is invariant to contextual changes. The argument that I examine purports to show that this case actually supports invariabilism about pleasure’s final value simpliciter, because the best explanation for why the vicious being pleased is a fitting object of indignation is that the vicious person’s pleasure is finally valuable simpliciter. I argue that this argument fails because the vicious person’s pleasure being finally personally good for them better explains why an attitude of indignation is fitting. I address two objections and conclude with remarks about how my results might inform future research on value invariabilism.



中文翻译:

价值不变性与价值的两个区别

在摩尔之后,价值不变主义者否认事物的内在价值会受到其内在特征的影响。本文的主要重点是(i)根据当代的价值论差异,研究不变性论点并扩展我们应如何理解它,以及(ii)辩称区分不同类型的不变性可提供破坏传统知识的资源。反对可变性的著名论点。首先,我用两个当代的价值论区分来阐明不变性辩论所关注的价值(最终价值)。然后,我展示了个人价值和价值简化者之间的区别根据一个人认为可能受外部特征影响的最终价值类型,我们揭示了不同的可变性论点。利用这一见解,我对最终值简化器不变性的观点提出了质疑。辩证主义者提供了一个使人恶心的例子,以此来反驳享乐的最终价值不随情境变化而改变的主张。我研究的论证表明该案例实际上支持了愉悦的最终价值简化者的不变性,因为对于为什么恶人高兴是愤慨的最佳解释是恶人的愉悦最终是有价值的简化者。我认为这种论证是失败的,因为这个恶人最终对他们个人有益的乐趣更好地解释了为什么一种愤慨的态度是合适的。我提出了两个反对意见,并以我的结果将如何为未来关于价值不变性的研究提供信息的方式作了总结。

更新日期:2021-03-14
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