This paper explores how contractual arrangements emerge in labor markets in response to two risky prospects that employers might face, namely production failure from natural hazard conditions and that from worker non-availability. Modeling the process of contract determination as a dynamic game of symmetric but imperfect information in the presence of power asymmetry between employers and workers, the paper posits, when workers have alternative employment opportunities, and employers seek to avoid labor shortage, employers would choose a ‘fixed’ rather than a ‘variable’ contract and bear the risk of supporting the hired workers even if hazardous conditions may realize later in nature.

本文探讨了劳动力市场中合同安排是如何出现的，以应对雇主可能面临的两个风险前景，即自然灾害条件下的生产失败和工人无法获得的前景。在雇主和工人之间存在权力不对称的情况下，将合同确定的过程建模为动态的对称但不完美的信息博弈，论文假设，当工人拥有替代性就业机会并且雇主试图避免劳动力短缺时，雇主会选择“固定”而不是“可变”合同，并且即使危险的情况可能在以后发生，也要承担支持雇用工人的风险。