In recent years, the study of the evolution of non-compliant behaviour in public procurement has been widely developed due to the growing economic relevance of this phenomenon. When such a question is formalized in terms of a dynamical model, new insights can be pursued, related to the possible evolution from a situation with low dishonesty level to high dishonesty level or vice versa. The present model considers an evolutionary adaptation process explaining whether honest or dishonest behaviour prevails in society at any given time by assuming endogenous monitoring by the State. We will distinguish between a scenario in which firms converge to monomorphic configurations (all honest or all dishonest) and a scenario in which firms converge to polymorphic compositions (that is with coexistence of both groups), depending on the relevant parameters. By making use of both analytical tools and numerical simulations, the present work aims at explaining the effectiveness of economic policies to reduce or eliminate non-compliant behaviour. Social stigma is found to play a key role: if the “inner attitude toward honesty” of a country is not strong enough, then dishonesty cannot be ruled out. However, increasing both the fine level attached to dishonest behaviour and the monitoring effort by the State can reduce asymptotic dishonesty levels and escape form the dishonesty trap.

近年来，由于这种现象与经济的相关性越来越高，对公共采购中违规行为演变的研究已得到广泛发展。当根据动力学模型形式化了这样一个问题时，就可以寻求新的见解，这涉及从不诚实程度低的情况到不诚实程度高的情况的可能演变，反之亦然。本模型考虑了进化适应过程，通过假设国家进行内生监督，解释了在任何给定时间在社会上普遍存在诚实还是不诚实的行为。我们将根据相关参数，将企业融合为单态配置的情况（所有诚实或全部不诚实）与企业融合为多态组合的情况（即两个组共存）进行区分。通过使用分析工具和数值模拟，本工作旨在解释减少或消除不合规行为的经济政策的有效性。人们发现社会污名化起着关键作用：如果一个国家的“对诚实的内心态度”不够强硬，那么就不能排除不诚实。但是，增加不诚实行为的罚款水平和国家的监督力度，可以减少渐进性不诚实水平，并从国家逃脱。不诚实的陷阱。