In Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility, Alfred Mele invokes radical reversal cases in which one agent is covertly manipulated to be just like another agent in relevant respects to defend a version of the following “externalist” thesis: how agents acquire their springs of action, such as desires and beliefs, bears on whether they are morally responsible for their actions. I assess proposed rationales for the crucial verdict that agents in such cases are not responsible for their germane actions. I argue for the superiority of Mele’s rationale and propose that these cases also support accepting an externalist constraint on other normative appraisals, such as those of practical rationality. Key words: Moral obligation; practical rationality; radical reversal cases; ultimate origination; zygote argument.

在操纵代理人中：道德责任的窗口，阿尔弗雷德·梅尔（Alfred Mele）提出了激进的逆转案例，在这种情况下，一个代理人在相关方面被暗中操纵，就像另一个代理人一样，捍卫了以下“外部主义”论点的版本：代理人如何获得其行动的动力，例如欲望和信念，因此产生了负担。他们是否对自己的行为负有道德责任。我评估了提出的基本结论，以得出关键结论，即在这种情况下，代理人不应对自己的密切行为负责。我主张梅勒理论基础的优越性，并提出这些案例也支持接受对其他规范性评估（如实践理性的评估）的外在约束。关键词：道德义务；实践合理性；重大逆转案件；最终起源；合子参数。