In this paper I explore various themes in Alfred Mele's Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility (OUP 2019). I develop four points. First, I argue that Mele's historical requirement for moral responsibility for developed morally responsible agents should be coupled with a nonhistorical theory of initially developing agents (like toddlers). Second, I argue that one might resist Mele's negative historical requirement (wherein agents must lack certain responsibility-defeating histories) with a minimal positive historical requirement according to which an agent has a history wherein she did not undergo any responsibility-defeating events, like being severely manipulated.Third, I also explore the idea that one who defended a nonhistorical view, such as Harry Frankfurt's, might rely on a different conception of what moral responsibility is. This might explain why some resisting Mele would not have the intuition that in certain cases a manipulated agent is not responsible. Finally, I question how we should think of the role of intuition in thought experiments figuring centrally in Mele's work.

在本文中，我探讨了阿尔弗雷德·梅尔（Alfred Mele）的《操纵的代理人：道德责任的窗口》（OUP 2019）中的各种主题。我提出四点。首先，我认为，梅勒（Mele）对发达的道德责任主体的道德责任的历史要求应与最初发展的主体（如幼儿）的非历史性理论相结合。其次，我认为有人可能会以最低限度的积极历史要求抵制Mele的消极历史要求（代理人必须缺乏某些违背责任的历史），据此，代理人的历史中没有经历过任何违反职责的事件，例如第三，我还探讨了这样一种观点，即捍卫非历史性观点的人，例如哈里·法兰克福（Harry Frankfurt）的观点，可能依赖于道德责任是什么的不同概念。这也许可以解释为什么有些抵抗者不会凭直觉在某些情况下不对操纵者负责。最后，我质疑我们应该如何思考直觉在Mele作品中集中体现的思想实验中的作用。