Following a brief summation of the phenomenological method, the paper considers three metaethical positions adopted by phenomenologists and the implications of those positions for a normative ethics. The metaethical positions combine epistemological and ontological viewpoints. They are (1) non-intellectualism and strong value realism as represented by the axiological views of phenomenologists such as Scheler, Meinong, Reinach, Stein, Hartmann, von Hildebrand, and Steinbock; (2) non-intellectualism and anti-realism as represented by the freedom-centered phenomenologies of Sartre, Beauvoir, and Merleau-Ponty; and (3) weak intellectualism and weak value realism as represented by Husserl and Drummond. The paper argues that only the third metaethical view can support a normative ethics (1) that is consistent with the essential features of the phenomenological method, (2) that allows for freedom in an agent’s choosing from a multiplicity of first-order goods, including vocational goods, practical identities, and life plans, available in the agent’s factical circumstances, and (3) that provides norms governing the correctness of our actions and our obligations to others. The normative dimension is introduced, first, by the requirement that the fulfillment of first-order evaluations and choices be truthful, that is, that the (emotive) evaluations be appropriate and the actions right. Second, transcendental considerations revealed in the phenomenological analysis of intentional experience disclose a notion of second-order goods of agency that universally bind agents in their exercise of freedom and their dealings with others.

在对现象学方法进行简要总结之后，本文考虑了现象学家所采用的三个元伦理学立场，以及这些立场对规范伦理学的意义。元伦理学的立场结合了认识论和本体论的观点。它们是（1）以非理性主义和强烈的价值现实主义为代表的现象学家，如舍勒，美农，赖纳赫，斯坦因，哈特曼，冯·希尔德布兰德和斯坦博克等现象学家的价值论观点；（2）以萨特，波伏娃和梅洛-庞蒂的以自由为中心的现象学为代表的非智力主义和反现实主义；（3）以胡塞尔和德拉蒙德为代表的弱智主义和弱价值现实主义。该论文认为，只有第三种元伦理学观点才能支持规范伦理学（1）与现象学方法的基本特征相一致（2）允许代理商从多种一阶商品中进行选择的自由，包括在代理人的实际情况下可用的职业产品，实际身份和生活计划，以及（3）提供规范我们行为正确性和我们对他人义务的准则。首先通过要求对一阶评估和选择的实现是真实的，即，（情感）评估是适当的并且行动是正确的，来引入规范维度。第二，