In Japan, the disclosure ordinance has been drastically enacted during the—1999–2010. Using an originally constructed panel dataset consisting of approximately 1700 local governments for 1999–2010, we empirically examined the influence of information disclosure ordinances on the income of chief executives in local Japanese governments. Furthermore, we also investigated how the effect of the ordinance changes with time. Our key finding was that the income of such local government officials decreased after implementing the ordinances; that income also declined with time. Hence, information disclosure about local government reduced the income of top officials, which increased with time. The income of chiefs executives was open, without the need for ordinances; however, the ordinances provided transparency regarding the work performance of chief executives. From this finding, we derive the argument that transparency reduces the chief executive’s income because of an increase in accountability.

中文翻译：

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日本信息公开条例执行情况分析：对地方政府行政长官收入的影响

日本在 1999 年至 2010 年期间颁布了大量披露条例。使用最初构建的由 1999-2010 年大约 1700 个地方政府组成的面板数据集，我们实证检验了信息披露条例对日本地方政府首席执行官收入的影响。此外，我们还调查了法令的影响如何随时间变化。我们的主要发现是，这些地方政府官员的收入在实施条例后减少了；随着时间的推移，收入也会下降。因此，地方政府的信息公开减少了高层官员的收入，而且随着时间的推移而增加。首席执行官的收入是公开的，不需要法令；然而，这些条例为首席执行官的工作表现提供了透明度。从这一发现中，我们得出这样的论点，即透明度降低了首席执行官的收入，因为问责制的增加。