The establishment of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM) is one of the important issues in the academic debate on a viable constitution for the European Monetary Union (EMU). Yet the topic seems to be taboo in official reform contributions to the debate. Against this backdrop, the article identifies the SDRM interests of key players, including the European Commission, the European Parliament, the European Central Bank and national governments. The empirical section takes advantage of the recently established EMU Positions Database. The findings confirm political economy expectations: Low-debt countries support an EMU constitution that includes an insolvency procedure whereas a coalition of high-debt countries and European institutions oppose it. The analysis points towards a possible political-economic equilibrium for coping with sovereign insolvencies: an institutional set-up without an SDRM and with hidden transfers. Recent European fiscal innovations in response to the Covid-19 solvency shock confirm this prediction.

建立主权债务重组机制（SDRM）是有关欧洲货币联盟（EMU）可行宪法的学术辩论中的重要问题之一。然而，在官方改革对辩论的贡献中，这个话题似乎是禁忌的。在这种背景下，本文确定了主要参与者的SDRM利益，包括欧洲委员会，欧洲议会，欧洲中央银行和各国政府。实证部分利用了最近建立的EMU职位数据库。调查结果证实了政治经济学的期望：低债务国家支持包含破产程序的欧洲货币联盟宪法，而高债务国家和欧洲机构的联盟则反对。分析指出了应对主权破产的可能的政治经济平衡：没有SDRM和隐性转移的体制设置。最近针对Covid-19偿付能力冲击的欧洲财政创新证实了这一预测。