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Power in office: presidents, governments, and parliaments in the institutional design of contemporary democracies
Constitutional Political Economy ( IF 0.8 ) Pub Date : 2020-10-28 , DOI: 10.1007/s10602-020-09318-2
Giuseppe Ieraci

The institutional design of democratic regimes has attracted much attention from a legal and political perspective, because it affects the actual distribution of power among political actors and the effectiveness of their decisions. The article advances a classification of the democratic institutional design, with particular reference to the triangular interactions among Presidents, Governments, and Parliaments. Moving from the assumption that the arrangements among these three top political institutions identify the main patterns of the democratic government, the distinction among Parliamentary, Presidential, and Semi-Presidential systems set by the constitutional law is rejected and a new classification schema is advanced. In this new perspective, the institutional design of democracy consists of the institutional roles of authority, procedural resources attached to them and arenas of confrontation among the roles.

中文翻译:

执政权力:当代民主制度设计中的总统、政府和议会

民主政权的制度设计从法律和政治的角度引起了很多关注,因为它影响政治行为者之间的实际权力分配及其决策的有效性。文章提出了民主制度设计的分类,特别提到了总统、政府和议会之间的三角互动。从这三个最高政治机构之间的安排确定民主政府的主要模式的假设出发,拒绝了宪法规定的议会制、总统制和半总统制之间的区别,并提出了新的分类模式。在这个新视角下,民主的制度设计包括权威的制度角色,
更新日期:2020-10-28
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