This article views the confrontation between pragmatism and Kant’s Critical undertaking as very possibly the single most consequential agon of contemporary philosophy, given the utter irreconcilability of their respective ways of addressing the concerns of First Philosophy, with regard to the enabling conditions of cognitive realism. Pragmatism favors an informal, fluxive, “instrumentalist” form of empiricism, impossible to complete, opposed to any and all the ontic and epistemic fixities of Kant’s Rationalism. Reason (Vernunft) cannot be more than a fiction. Kant has no supporting criterion of realism. The article proposes an empirical criterion of the distinctive (given) “duality” of sensory “appearings” and “appeareds” (that is, objects) as yielding a plausible “cognitive faculty” (involving “reasoning”—inference, for instance—but not Vernunft) that, in accord with the drift of evolutionism and Aristotle, readily extends to languageless animals as well as humans. It serves as the linchpin of the paper.

中文翻译：

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重拾实用主义

考虑到实用主义和康德批判事业之间的对抗很可能是当代哲学中唯一最重要的痛苦，因为它们各自解决第一哲学关注的方式在认知实在论的促成条件方面完全不可调和。实用主义偏爱一种非正式的、流动的、“工具主义”形式的经验主义，不可能完成，反对康德理性主义的任何和所有本体论和认识论的固定性。原因 ( Vernunft) 只能是虚构的。康德没有支持实在论的标准。这篇文章提出了一个经验标准，将感觉“显现”和“显现”（即对象）的独特（给定）“二元性”作为产生似是而非的“认知能力”（包括“推理”——例如推理——但不是 Vernunft），根据进化论和亚里士多德的倾向，很容易扩展到无语言的动物和人类。它是论文的关键。