Janice Moulton's “The Adversary Method: A Philosophical Paradigm” articulated several criticisms of the popular idea of philosophy as adversarial debate. Moulton criticizes it on epistemic grounds, arguing that philosophy's overreliance on adversarial debate is to the detriment of its goals. Some, notably Trudy Govier, have argued in favor of at least a minimal adversariality, governed by norms of respectful argumentation. This paper suggests that Govier's faith in these norms is misplaced, because it neglects the social circumstances of the arguers. While some authors have argued that politeness and aggression apply differently to those of different genders, this paper extends that analysis to social identities other than gender. In fact, given certain assumptions about the philosophy of language, engagement in polite adversarial debate may not even be possible for people occupying certain social locations.

中文翻译：

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论证，对抗性和社会规范

珍妮丝·摩尔顿（Janice Moulton）的“对抗方法：一种哲学范式”明确提出了对作为对抗性辩论的流行哲学理念的一些批评。莫尔顿以认识论为由对其进行批评，认为哲学过分依赖对抗性辩论会损害其目标。一些人，尤其是特鲁迪·戈维尔（Trudy Govier），主张至少应由对抗性规范规范的对抗性最小化。本文认为，高维耶（Govier）对这些规范的信念是错误的，因为它忽视了辩论者的社会环境。尽管一些作者认为礼貌和侵略对不同性别的人适用不同，但本文将这种分析扩展到了除性别之外的社会身份。实际上，鉴于对语言哲学的某些假设，居住在某些社交场所的人们可能的。