In a two‐period model with two groups of countries that extract, trade, and consume fossil fuels, a climate coalition fights against climate change by purchasing or leasing deposits to prevent their extraction and seeks to manipulate fuel prices in its favor. The policy of purchasing deposits is inefficient because it leaves the first‐period climate externality non‐internalized. By contrast, the deposit‐lease policy turns out to be efficient if it eliminates strategic action in the fuel markets. In an empirically calibrated economy, the coalition's welfare and total welfare are greater with the deposit‐lease policy than with the deposit‐purchase policy if the discount rate is smaller than 2.7 percent per annum.

中文翻译：

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购买和租赁燃料沉积以进行保存*

在有两个国家提取，贸易和消费化石燃料的两个时期的模型中，一个气候联盟通过购买或租赁矿床以防止其开采来对抗气候变化，并试图操纵有利于其的燃料价格。购买存款的政策效率低下，因为它使第一时期的气候外部性没有被内部化。相比之下，如果取消燃料市场中的战略行动，则存款租赁政策实际上是有效的。在按经验进行校准的经济中，如果贴现率每年低于2.7％，则使用存款租赁政策的联盟的福利和总福利要大于使用存款购买政策的联盟的福利和总福利。