Should workers be provided with insurance against search‐induced wage fluctuations? To answer this question, I rely on the numerical simulations of a model of on‐the‐job search and precautionary savings. The model is calibrated to low‐skilled workers in the United States. The extent of insurance is determined by the degree of progressivity of a non‐linear transfer schedule. The fundamental trade‐off is that a more generous provision of insurance reduces incentives to search for better‐paying jobs, which increases the cost of providing insurance. I show that progressivity raises the search intensity of unemployed workers, which reduces the equilibrium rate of unemployment, but it lowers the search intensity of employed job seekers, which reduces the output level. I also solve numerically for the optimal non‐linear transfer schedule. The optimal policy is to provide little insurance up to a monthly income level of $1350, so as to preserve incentives to move up the wage ladder, and nearly full insurance above $1450. This policy reduces the standard deviation of labor income net of transfers by 34 per cent and generates a consumption‐equivalent welfare gain of 0.7 per cent. The absence of private savings does not fundamentally change the shape of the optimal transfer function, but tilts the optimal policy towards more insurance, at the expense of a less efficient allocation of workers across jobs.

中文翻译：

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关于针对搜索引起的工资波动提供保险*

是否应为工人提供因搜索引起的工资波动的保险？为了回答这个问题，我依靠在职搜索和预防性储蓄模型的数值模拟。该模型已针对美国的低技能工人进行了校准。保险的范围由非线性转帐计划的累进程度决定。基本的权衡是，提供更慷慨的保险会减少寻找更高薪工作的动机，从而增加了提供保险的成本。我发现进步性提高了失业工人的搜寻强度，降低了失业的均衡率，但降低了就业求职者的搜寻强度，从而降低了产出水平。我还用数值方法求解了最佳的非线性传输计划。最佳政策是为每月收入达到$ 1350的人群提供很少的保险，以保持提高工资阶梯的诱因，并为高于$ 1450的人群提供几乎全部的保险。这项政策将扣除转移的劳动收入的标准差减少了34％，并产生了相当于消费的0.7％的福利收益。缺乏私人储蓄并不能从根本上改变最优转移函数的形状，但是会使最优政策向更多的保险倾斜，以牺牲工人在各个工作中的效率较低为代价。这项政策将扣除转移的劳动收入的标准差减少了34％，并产生了相当于消费的0.7％的福利收益。缺乏私人储蓄并不能从根本上改变最优转移函数的形状，但是会使最优政策向更多的保险倾斜，以牺牲工人在各个工作中的效率较低为代价。这项政策将扣除转移的劳动收入的标准差减少了34％，并产生了相当于消费的0.7％的福利收益。缺乏私人储蓄并不能从根本上改变最优转移函数的形状，但是会使最优政策向更多的保险倾斜，以牺牲工人在各个工作中的效率较低为代价。