We examine how business strategy affects stock price informativeness which in turn influences analyst coverage efficiency. Using stock price synchronicity and the probability of informed trading as proxies for stock price informativeness, we show that stock prices of prospectors are less informative than those of defenders. Next, we explore two channels through which business strategy influences analyst coverage efficiency. We first test and find support for an information transfer channel, i.e., the higher stock price synchronicity of prospectors facilitates more information transfer by analysts, resulting in higher analyst coverage efficiency of prospectors than defenders. Next, we test and find support for an informed trading channel, i.e., the higher probability of informed trading on stocks of defenders intensifies competition between informed traders and analysts. Such competition adversely affects analyst coverage efficiency, leading to lower analyst coverage efficiency of defenders than prospectors. Our findings are robust to an array of robustness checks including 2SLS/IV tests, differences‐in‐difference tests, and high‐tech industry sensitivity analyses.

中文翻译：

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业务策略，股价信息和分析师覆盖率

我们研究了业务战略如何影响股票价格信息，进而影响了分析师的覆盖率。使用股票价格的同步性和知情交易的概率作为股票价格信息的代理，我们表明，探矿者的股票信息不如辩护者的信息丰富。接下来，我们探索业务战略影响分析师覆盖效率的两个渠道。我们首先测试并找到对信息传输渠道的支持，即，探矿者更高的股价同步性有助于分析师进行更多的信息传递，从而导致探矿者的分析师覆盖效率高于防御者。接下来，我们测试并找到对知情交易渠道的支持，即 防御者股票进行知情交易的可能性越高，知情交易者与分析师之间的竞争越激烈。这种竞争对分析员的覆盖率产生不利影响，导致防御者的分析员覆盖率低于勘探者。我们的发现对包括2SLS / IV测试，差异差异测试和高科技行业敏感性分析在内的一系列稳健性检查是可靠的。