In this paper, I introduce a new species of elusive reason–reasons that it is impossible for an agent to act, or be motivated to act, for–and I show how this kind of elusive reason undermines a plausible claim about normative reasons, the Motivational Constraint. To defend the existence of this new kind of elusive reason, I respond to the objection that our intuitions are tracking another normative or evaluative phenomenon, such as reasons to have certain affective responses or reasons for others to act. In addition, because accepting the new kind of elusive reason requires affirming the claim that S acts for a reason p only if S regards p as a reason to A, I develop an account of what it is for S to regard p as a reason to A. Finally, as part of arguing for the former claim, I argue that the idea of being moved to A for a reason p entails the idea of being moved to A in light of p, which itself entails the idea of regarding p as a reason.

中文翻译：

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引入一个新的难以捉摸的原因

在本文中，我介绍了一种新的难以捉摸的理由——代理人不可能采取行动或被激励采取行动的原因，因为——我展示了这种难以捉摸的理由如何破坏关于规范理由的似是而非的主张，动机约束。为了捍卫这种新的难以捉摸的理由的存在，我回应了这样的反对意见，即我们的直觉正在追踪另一种规范或评价现象，例如有某些情感反应的理由或他人采取行动的理由。此外，因为接受这种新的难以捉摸的理由需要确认S仅在S将 p 视为A的理由时S以理由 p 行动的主张，所以我发展了它对S 的意义的说明将 p 视为A的理由。最后，对于前者要求主张的一部分，我认为，中移动的想法一个是有原因的p需要被移动的想法一中的光P，它本身需要有关P作为理性的想法。