Recently, self-fulfilling cases, that is, ones in which an agent's believing a proposition guarantees its truth, have been offered as counterexamples to uniqueness. According to uniqueness, at most one doxastic attitude is epistemically rational given the evidence. I argue that self-fulfilling cases are not counterexamples to uniqueness because belief-formation is not governed by epistemic rationality in such cases. Specifically, this is because epistemic rationality is not just about forming true beliefs, but about tracking mind-independent truths. In support of the latter claim, I offer three arguments, namely that self-fulfilling and non-self-fulfilling cases differ in their phenomenology, in the norms that guide belief formation, and in the way they relate to the evidence.

中文翻译：

---

放任主义和自我实现的命题

最近，自我实现的案例，即代理相信一个命题保证其真实性的案例，已被用作唯一性的反例。根据唯一性，在给定证据的情况下，至多一种信念态度在认识上是合理的。我认为自我实现的情况不是唯一性的反例，因为在这种情况下，信念的形成不受认知理性的支配。具体来说，这是因为认知理性不仅是关于形成真正的信念，而且是关于追踪独立于心灵的真理。为了支持后一种主张，我提供了三个论点，即自我实现和非自我实现的案例在现象学、指导信念形成的规范以及它们与证据的关联方式上有所不同。