Metaethical realists believe that moral facts exist, but they disagree among themselves about whether moral facts have ontological import. Robust realists think that they do. Quietist realists deny this. I argue that quietist realism faces a new objection; viz., the moral determination objection. This is the objection that general moral facts (or moral principles) must determine specific moral facts (or which actions in the world are right and wrong) but that general moral facts cannot do this if they lack ontological import. I also argue that some robust realists can answer the moral determination objection. This gives these robust realists an edge over quietist realism.

中文翻译：

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安静的元伦理现实主义和道德决定

元伦理实在论者相信道德事实是存在的，但他们对道德事实是否具有本体论意义存在分歧。稳健的现实主义者认为他们确实如此。安静主义现实主义者否认这一点。我认为安静主义现实主义面临新的反对意见；即，道德决定反对。这是一种反对意见，即普遍道德事实（或道德原则）必须决定具体道德事实（或世界上哪些行为是对与错），但如果普遍道德事实缺乏本体论意义，则无法做到这一点。我还认为，一些稳健的现实主义者可以回答道德决定论的反对意见。这使这些强大的现实主义者比安静的现实主义者更具优势。