This paper evaluates the claim that some desires provide reasons in virtue of their connection with conscious affective experiences like feelings of attraction or aversion. I clarify the nature of affective desires and several distinct ways in which affective desires might provide reasons. Against accounts proposed by Ruth Chang, Declan Smithies and Jeremy Weiss, I motivate doubts that it is the phenomenology of affective experiences that explains their normative or rational significance. I outline an alternative approach that centralises the function of such experiences.

中文翻译：

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情感欲望是否为行动提供了理由？

本文评估了以下说法：某些欲望凭借其与有意识的情感体验（如吸引力或厌恶感）的联系而提供了理由。我阐明了情感欲望的本质以及情感欲望可能提供理由的几种不同方式。与 Ruth Chang、Declan Smithies 和 Jeremy Weiss 提出的说法相反，我怀疑是情感体验的现象学解释了它们的规范或理性意义。我概述了一种将此类体验的功能集中起来的替代方法。