I question whether the case for ‘literary cognitivism’ has generally been successfully made. As it is usually construed, the thesis is easy to satisfy illegitimately because dependence on fictionality is not built in as a requirement. The thesis of literary cognitivism should say: ‘literary fiction can be a source of knowledge in a way that depends crucially on its being fictional’ (Green's phrasing). After questioning whether nonpropositional cognitivist views (e.g., Nussbaum's) meet this neglected standard, I argue that if fictional narratives can impart propositional knowledge in virtue of their fictionality, it would be largely via a suppositional framework. Yet in many cases, such as Huxley's Brave New World, the key literary supposition could simply be an epistemic possibility (‘suppose X, which for all we know, occurs sometime’), not counterfactual supposition, that is, distinctively fictional supposition. The best general case for literary cognitivism may be the limited one that literary fiction can alert us to nonactual metaphysical possibilities that may be important for understanding actuality. Yet even here, seemingly possible fictions are often impossible.

中文翻译：

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有文学认知这种东西吗？

我质疑“文学认知主义”的案例是否已经普遍成功。正如通常所解释的那样，该论文很容易被非法满足，因为对虚构性的依赖并不是作为一项要求而内置的。文学认知主义的论点应该说：“文学小说可以成为知识的来源，这在很大程度上取决于它的虚构性”（格林的措辞）。在质疑非命题认知主义观点（例如，努斯鲍姆的）是否符合这一被忽视的标准之后，我认为，如果虚构叙事能够凭借其虚构性来传递命题知识，那将主要是通过一个假设框架。然而在很多情况下，比如赫胥黎的美丽新世界，，据我们所知，有时会发生'），而不是反事实假设，即独特的虚构假设。文学认知主义最好的一般情况可能是文学小说可以提醒我们注意可能对理解现实很重要的非实际形而上学可能性的有限情况。然而，即使在这里，看似可能的虚构也往往是不可能的。