The vast majority of metaphysicians agree that powers (in contrast to categorical properties) can exist unmanifested. This paper focuses on the ontological distinction between unmanifested and manifested powers underpinning that fact and has two main aims. First, to determine the proper relata of the distinction and second, to show that an unrestricted version of dispositional monism faces serious difficulties to accommodate it. As far as the first aim is concerned, it is argued that the distinction in question, in order to be free of irrelevant features, must hold between an unmanifested power-instance and the same power-instance being manifested. To the second end, the paper examines two possible candidate distinctions (actual vs. possible, being-in-energeia vs. being-in-capacity). It is argued that the former fails to be a good fit for the role that the distinction under consideration should play in a dispositional monistic context. It is also argued that a specific version of the latter can ground a promising solution to the difficulty discussed in the paper. That solution, however, presupposes the inclusion of aspects of the Aristotelian metaphysical framework for powers to the dispositional monistic context.

中文翻译：

---

性格一元论和未表现和表现的权力之间的本体论区别

绝大多数形而上学家同意权力（与绝对属性相反）可以不显化地存在。本文重点关注支撑这一事实的未表现和表现力量之间的本体论区别，并有两个主要目标。首先，确定区别的适当关系，其次，表明不受限制的倾向性一元论版本面临严重的困难以适应它。就第一个目标而言，有人认为，为了避免不相关的特征，所讨论的区别必须在未表现的力量实例和正在表现的相同力量实例之间成立。在第二个方面，论文检查了两种可能的候选人区别（实际与可能，处于精力状态与处于能力状态）。有人认为，前者不能很好地适应所考虑的区别在性格一元论背景下应发挥的作用。也有人认为，后者的特定版本可以为论文中讨论的困难提供有希望的解决方案。然而，该解决方案的前提是将亚里士多德形而上学的权力框架的各个方面纳入倾向性一元论背景。