Self‐deception is typically considered epistemically irrational, for it involves holding certain doxastic attitudes against strong counter‐evidence. Pragmatic encroachment about epistemic rationality says that whether it is epistemically rational to believe, withhold belief or disbelieve something can depend on perceived practical factors of one's situation. In this paper I argue that some cases of self‐deception satisfy what pragmatic encroachment considers sufficient conditions for epistemic rationality. As a result, we face the following dilemma: either we revise the received view about self‐deception or we deny pragmatic encroachment on epistemic rationality. I suggest that the dilemma can be solved if we pay close attention to the distinction between ideal and bounded rationality. I argue that the problematic cases fail to meet standards of ideal rationality but exemplify bounded rationality. The solution preserves pragmatic encroachment on bounded rationality, but denies it on ideal rationality.

中文翻译：

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自我欺骗和务实侵占：认知理性的困境

自我欺骗通常被认为在认识论上是不合理的，因为它涉及对强烈的反证证据持有某些不确定的态度。认识论理性的语用侵犯说，相信，保留信念或不相信某件事在认识论上是理性的，这取决于一个人处境的感知实际因素。在本文中，我认为某些自欺欺人的案例满足了实用主义认为的认知合理性的充分条件。结果，我们面临以下困境：要么我们修改所接受的关于自欺欺人的观点，要么我们否认对认知理性的实用侵犯。我建议，如果我们密切关注理想理性与有限理性之间的区别，就可以解决这个难题。我认为有问题的案例不能满足理想理性的标准，但却是有限理性的例证。该解决方案保留了对有限理性的实用侵犯，但否认了理想理性。