Two conditions have been thought necessary and sufficient for a person to be morally responsible. The first is a control condition: an agent must control the actions for which she is held responsible. The second is an epistemic condition: an agent must know, or have the right kind of cognitive relationship to, the relevant features of what she is doing. Debate about moral responsibility among contemporary philosophers can be neatly divided into two circles, with each circle attending narrowly to one of these two conditions. I argue that these separate debates should not be had so separately. The two conditions on moral responsibility interact in a way that has been neglected. An agent's possession of knowledge, and her capacity to attain knowledge, increase that agent's control in a sense relevant to the control condition on moral responsibility. Conversely, an agent's control of her actions can be used to acquire knowledge in a sense relevant to the epistemic condition on moral responsibility. It is in this way that a sort of feedback loop arises between the epistemic condition and the control condition—each is capable of augmenting the degree to which their possessor satisfies the other. I argue that this interaction has important implications for each debate.

中文翻译：

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论道德代理的一个被忽视的特征

人们认为两个条件对于一个人在道德上负责是必要的和充分的。首先是控制条件：座席必须控制她要负责的行为。第二个是认知病：代理人必须了解她正在做的相关特征，或者与其具有正确的认知关系。当代哲学家关于道德责任的辩论可以整齐地分为两个圈子，每个圈子都只涉及这两个条件之一。我认为，不应将这些单独的辩论分开进行。道德责任的两个条件以一种被忽视的方式相互作用。代理人对知识的掌握及其获取知识的能力会增加该代理人的 在某种程度上与道德责任的控制条件有关的控制。相反，代理人对其行为的控制可以用来获取与道德责任的认知条件有关的知识。通过这种方式，在认知条件和控制条件之间会出现一种反馈回路-每个反馈环都能提高其拥有者彼此满足的程度。我认为这种互动对每次辩论都具有重要意义。通过这种方式，在认知条件和控制条件之间会出现一种反馈回路-每个反馈环都能提高其拥有者彼此满足的程度。我认为这种互动对每次辩论都具有重要意义。通过这种方式，在认知条件和控制条件之间会出现一种反馈回路-每个反馈环都能提高其拥有者彼此满足的程度。我认为这种互动对每次辩论都具有重要意义。