Sustainably managing regional-scale common pool resources and providing for environmental public goods often requires the cooperation of multiple governments in the design and adoption of diverse institutional arrangements. Do government actors anticipate the collective action challenges of credible commitment and public goods provision in devising institutional arrangements? Drawing on public–private partnerships, local public contracting and political economy literatures, hypotheses on expected diversity in design are developed. The hypotheses are tested using fine-grained data from the approximately 3,000 rules composing the New York City watersheds governing arrangements focusing on measures of discretion, shared decision-making, monitoring, compliance and sanctioning. Using mixed methods we find that actors resort to distinct designs to create credible commitments, when compared to the provision of public goods. Also, the design of primary public goods arrangements varies from secondary public goods. The article presents a novel approach for using textual data to empirically test hypotheses grounded in theories of institutional design.

中文翻译：

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复杂公地的制度设计：可信承诺的设计和公共物品的提供的变化

可持续地管理区域规模的公共池资源和提供环境公共产品通常需要多个政府在设计和采用不同的制度安排方面的合作。政府行为者在制定制度安排时是否预见到可信承诺和公共产品供应的集体行动挑战？借鉴公私合作伙伴关系、地方公共合同和政治经济学文献，对设计的预期多样性提出了假设。假设使用来自纽约市流域管理安排的大约 3,000 条规则的细粒度数据进行测试，这些规则侧重于自由裁量权、共享决策、监控、合规和制裁措施。使用混合方法，我们发现与提供公共物品相比，参与者采用不同的设计来创造可信的承诺。此外，初级公共产品安排的设计不同于次级公共产品。本文提出了一种使用文本数据对基于制度设计理论的假设进行实证检验的新方法。