Thomas McNally’s “More than a feeling: Wittgenstein and William James on love and other emotions” is one of the very few studies on Wittgenstein on love. McNally claims that Wittgenstein does not have a unified account of emotions. In his opinion, Wittgenstein’s criterial view applies to simple emotions and simple kinds of love, but not to deep kinds of love. In this paper, I show that McNally’s interpretation contains a number of misunderstandings of Wittgenstein’s criterial view and his treatment of emotions and of love. I offer an alternative interpretation, which corrects these misunderstandings. I show that Wittgenstein’s criterial view is applicable to all mental phenomena, including all kinds of love.

中文翻译：

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如何（不）阅读维特根斯坦：麦克纳利谈维特根斯坦谈爱情

托马斯麦克纳利的“不仅仅是一种感觉：维特根斯坦和威廉詹姆斯关于爱情和其他情感”是维特根斯坦关于爱情的极少数研究之一。麦克纳利声称维特根斯坦没有统一的情绪描述。在他看来，维特根斯坦的标准观适用于简单的情感和简单的爱，而不适用于深层次的爱。在这篇论文中，我表明麦克纳利的解释包含对维特根斯坦的标准观点以及他对情感和爱的处理的一些误解。我提供了另一种解释，以纠正这些误解。我表明维特根斯坦的标准观点适用于所有心理现象，包括各种爱。