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Wittgenstein’s Conception of Hypotheses in Chapters XII and XXII of ‘Philosophical Remarks’ and the Function of Language
Philosophical Investigations ( IF 0.4 ) Pub Date : 2020-10-25 , DOI: 10.1111/phin.12293
Florian Franken Figueiredo 1
Affiliation  

In this paper, I explore Wittgenstein’s conception of a hypothesis as articulated in Chapters XII and XXII of ‘Philosophical Remarks’. First, I argue that in Chapter XII, Wittgenstein draws on his account of infinity to begin to challenge the view that all hypotheses can be proven by empirical evidence. I then argue that in Chapter XXII that Wittgenstein sharpens this conception of hypotheses claiming that no hypotheses can be verified. Finally, I suggest that Wittgenstein’s conception of a hypothesis relates to his practical view of how language functions.

中文翻译:

维特根斯坦的“哲学话语”第十二章和第二十二章中的假设概念和语言的功能

在本文中,我将探究维特根斯坦关于“哲学话语”的第十二章和第二十二章阐明的假设的概念。首先,我认为维特根斯坦在第十二章中利用无穷大的观点开始质疑所有假设都可以由经验证据证明的观点。然后,我认为在第二十二章中,维特根斯坦(Wittgenstein)强化了这种假设的概念,声称没有任何假设可以得到验证。最后,我建议维特根斯坦的假设概念与他关于语言如何运作的实践观点有关。
更新日期:2020-10-25
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