According to Charles Parsons, a liar sentence does not express a proposition at the level of its primary use but does at the level where it is subjected to semantic interpretation. Thus, richer ontological resources unavailable at the level of primary use are available at the level of interpretation. In response to the objection that the correct semantic interpretation of a liar sentence is thereby distorted, I explain how Wittgenstein’s repudiation of “logical objects” and the Tractarian notion of an intrinsically iterative operation show that the liar sentence’s primary use anticipates but does not presuppose the richer interpretive ontology.

中文翻译：

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帕森斯的故事：对语义悖论的拖拉机思考

根据查尔斯·帕森斯（Charles Parsons）的说法，撒谎者的句子在其主要用途的级别上并不表示一个命题，而是在其经受语义解释的级别上表达。因此，在解释级别可以获得在主要用途级别无法获得的更丰富的本体资源。为了回应反对者误解了说谎者句子的正确语义解释的问题，我解释了维特根斯坦对“逻辑对象”的否定和固有迭代操作的特拉维那概念如何表明，说谎者句子的主要用途是预期的，而不是假设更丰富的解释本体。