To show affective empathy is to share in another person's experiences, including her emotions. Most philosophers who write about emotions accept the broadly cognitivist view that emotions are rationally connected with beliefs. We argue that affective empathy is also rationally connected with belief; you can only share in another's emotions insofar as you can share certain of her beliefs. In light of that claim, we argue that affective empathy brings both epistemic dangers and epistemic benefits, that the ideal of universal empathy cannot be built upon affective empathy, and that affective empathy cannot be the basis of morality.

中文翻译：

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共同的信念和同理心的局限

表现出情感上的同理心就是分享另一个人的经历，包括她的情绪。大多数写情感的哲学家都接受广泛的认知主义观点，即情感与信念有理性联系。我们认为情感同理心也与信念有理性联系。你只能分享他人的情感，只要你能分享她的某些信念。根据这一主张，我们认为情感移情带来认知危险和认知益处，普遍移情的理想不能建立在情感移情之上，情感移情不能成为道德的基础。