I discuss an objection by Margaret Wilson against Robert Brandom's interpretation of Leibniz's account of perceptual distinctness. According to Brandom, Leibniz holds that (i) the relative distinctness of a perception is a function of its inferentially articulated content and (ii) apperception, or awareness, is explicable in terms of degrees of perceptual distinctness. Wilson alleges that Brandom confuses ‘external deducibility’ from a perceptual state of a monad to the existence of properties in the world, with ‘internally accessible content’ for the monad in that state. Drawing on Leibniz, I develop a response to Wilson on Brandom's behalf.

中文翻译：

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布兰登的莱布尼兹

我讨论了玛格丽特·威尔逊（Margaret Wilson）反对罗伯特·布兰登（Robert Brandom）对莱布尼兹（Leibniz）的感知独特性的解释的反对意见。根据布兰顿（Brandom）的说法，莱布尼兹（Leibniz）认为：（i）感知的相对清晰性是其推理表达的内容的函数，并且（ii）感知性或感知性可以根据感知清晰性的程度进行解释。威尔逊称，布兰顿混淆了“外部deducibility”从一个单子的感性状态，以在全球性的存在，以“从内部访问的内容”为在该状态下的单子。我利用莱布尼兹（Leibniz），代表布兰登（Brandom）对威尔逊（Wilson）做出回应。