The focus of this paper is the following claim: as a purely conceptual matter, the moral truths could be pretty much anything, and we should assume this in assessing our reliability at grasping moral truths. This claim, which I call No Content, plays a key role in an important skeptical argument against realist moral knowledge – the Normative Lottery Argument. In this paper, I argue that moral realists can, and should, reject No Content. My argument centers on the idea of practical intelligibility. I explore different aspects of practical intelligibility, and I argue that such intelligibility sets a constraint on the possibilities we should consider when assessing our reliability at grasping moral truths.

中文翻译：

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实用的可理解性和道德怀疑主义：现实主义者是否应该担心草皮柜台和手工敲门？

本文的重点是以下主张：作为一个纯粹的概念性问题，道德真理几乎可以是任何东西，我们应该在评估我们掌握道德真理的可靠性时假设这一点。这种说法，我称之为“无内容”，在反对现实主义道德知识的重要怀疑论据（规范彩票论证）中起着关键作用。在本文中，我认为道德现实主义者可以而且应该拒绝“无内容”。我的论点集中在实用可懂度的概念上。我探讨了实际可理解性的各个方面，并且我认为这种可理解性限制了在评估我们掌握道德真理的可靠性时应考虑的可能性。