This paper addresses one of the three main themes of Neville's The Goodness Is One, Its Manifestations Many: Whether Confucian ethics can be appropriately characterized as a virtue ethics. It first examines some unique features of virtues ethics, concluding that Confucian ethics may be plausibly regarded as a virtue ethics. Then it shows that virtue ethics is immune to the two diseases that Neville worries about: subjectivism and individualism. Finally, it argues that what Neville regards as salient features of Confucian ethics, (1) situationism, (2) attention to knowledge and skills beyond virtues, and (3) consequentialism of principle, can all be kept intact when it is characterized as a virtue ethics.

中文翻译：

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为什么儒家伦理是一种道德伦理，道德伦理不是一个坏东西，内维尔应该赞同

本文论述了内维尔的《善是为一，其表现形式很多》的三个主要主题之一：儒家伦理学是否可以适当地归类为美德伦理学。它首先考察了美德伦理学的一些独特特征，得出结论认为，儒家伦理学可以合理地视为美德伦理学。然后表明，美德伦理可以免除内维尔担心的两种疾病：主观主义和个人主义。最后，它认为内维尔认为的儒家伦理学的显着特征是：（1）情境主义；（2）对超越美德的知识和技能的关注；（3）原则的结果主义；如果将其描述为“道德”，就可以保持原样。美德伦理。