We find that independent directors in more corrupt countries receive greater pay. This relation could reflect outside directors in corrupt countries expropriating firm value, or it could reflect higher compensation for the additional effort required to lessen the negative effects of corruption. Acquirer acquisition announcement returns are lower in more corrupt countries, and this relation is mitigated by higher director pay. Higher director pay is also associated with greater sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm performance and moderates the negative effects of country‐level corruption on firm value. This evidence is consistent with higher director pay in corrupt countries incentivizing effort.

中文翻译：

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独立董事薪酬，腐败和监督

我们发现，在更多腐败国家中的独立董事可获得更高的报酬。这种关系可能反映出腐败国家中的外部董事侵占公司价值，或者可能反映出为减轻腐败的负面影响而需要付出的额外努力而获得的更高报酬。在更多腐败的国家中，收购方的收购公告收益较低，而较高的董事酬金可以缓解这种关系。更高的董事薪酬还与首席执行官离职对公司绩效的更大敏感性相关，并减轻了国家层面腐败对公司价值的负面影响。这一证据与腐败国家激励工作的较高董事薪酬相吻合。