Recent reconstructions of Heidegger's thoughts on ethics have a curious paradoxical feature. On the one hand, Heidegger, particularly in his Aristotle lectures of the 1920s, offers a view of practical reason on which Dasein has its “moral knowledge” in a fully perceptual, non-cognitive way. This generally sets Heidegger in opposition to the whole business of principled moral justification before the fact. On the other hand, the literature is peppered with what appear to be principled denunciations of immorality—particularly violations of other Dasein—grounded in the analytic of Dasein. To see human life as having a stable ergon (“business” or “function”), with certain broad tasks to pursue and vices to avoid, is not necessarily counter-Aristotelian; on the contrary, it is basic to the kind of Aristotelianism Husserl pursued in his own lectures on ethics. Here I set Heidegger's Aristotelian model of practical reason amid the competing, though similar, Aristotelianisms of John McDowell and Husserl, which differ on their handling of the human ergon. I conclude that Heidegger's views on practical reason and moral knowledge certainly constrain and very much alter the business of moral justification, but they do not precisely rule it out.

中文翻译：

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海德格尔论亚里士多德的 phronêsis 和道德辩护

最近对海德格尔伦理学思想的重构有一个奇怪的矛盾特征。一方面，海德格尔，特别是在他 1920 年代的亚里士多德讲座中，提供了一种实践理性的观点，此在以一种完全感性的、非认知的方式拥有其“道德知识”。这通常使海德格尔反对事前有原则的道德辩护。另一方面，文献中充斥着以对此在的分析为基础的对不道德的原则性谴责——尤其是对其他此在的侵犯——的原则性谴责。把人的生命看作是有一个稳定的ergon（“业务”或“职能”）具有某些广泛的任务要追求和恶习要避免，不一定是反亚里士多德的；相反，它是胡塞尔在他自己的伦理学讲座中所追求的那种亚里士多德主义的基础。在这里，我将海德格尔的亚里士多德实践理性模型置于约翰·麦克道威尔和胡塞尔的虽然相似但相互竞争的亚里士多德主义中，它们在对人类尔根的处理上有所不同。我的结论是，海德格尔关于实践理性和道德知识的观点确实限制并极大地改变了道德辩护的业务，但它们并没有完全排除它。