“Object” is one of the most important concepts in Kant's philosophy. I argue that Kant's concept of an object involves a hitherto neglected distinction, between what I call the “quantificational” concept of an object (q-object) and what I call the “representational” concept of an object (r-object). I examine the relation between these two concepts and argue that there is a close connection, even in the case of q-objects we cannot sensibly intuit (negative noumena) and the r-objects of non-sensible intuition (positive noumena). Even in the non-sensible case, our only way of representing a concept as having non-sensible instances (q-objects) is by conceiving of a kind of intellect that would intuit those objects. We cannot know that such intuition or such objects are possible, but it is only by thinking of such intuition that we can think of such objects as instances of concepts (e.g., the concept “negative noumena”).

中文翻译：

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康德和对象的概念

“对象”是康德哲学中最重要的概念之一。我认为康德的客体概念涉及一种迄今为止被忽视的区别，即我称之为客体的“量化”概念（q-object）和我称之为客体的“具象”概念（r-object）之间的区别。我检查了这两个概念之间的关系，并认为存在密切联系，即使在 q 对象的情况下，我们也无法感知直觉（否定本体）和非感性直觉的 r 对象（正本体）。即使在非感性的情况下，我们将概念表示为具有非感性实例（q 对象）的唯一方法是构想一种可以直觉这些对象的智力。我们无法知道这样的直觉或这样的对象是可能的，