In this paper, I propose a Husserlian account of perceptual confidence, and argue for perceptual confidence by appeal to the self-justification of perceptual experiences. Perceptual confidence is the intriguing view, recently developed by John Morrison, that there are not just doxastic confidences but also perceptual confidences, that is, confidences as aspect of perceptual experience, enabling us to account, for example, for the increasing confidence with which we experience an approaching human figure, while telling ourselves, as the viewing distance diminishes, “It looks like this just could be Isaac,” “It looks like this is probably Isaac,” “It looks like this is almost certainly Isaac.” I first present my Husserlian account with a focus on the notion of fulfillment, and the idea that the contents of perceptual experience are fulfillment conditions. I then show that this account can be complemented by PC. Finally, I develop a focus on the idea of perceptual self-justification, diverting the perceptual confidence debate from its pre-eminent concern with the relations between perceptual and doxastic confidences, and present an argument to the effect that there are perceptual confidences.

中文翻译：

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知觉自信：胡塞尔观点

在这篇论文中，我提出了一个胡塞尔对知觉自信的解释，并通过诉诸知觉经验的自我证明来论证知觉自信。知觉自信是一个有趣的观点，最近由约翰莫里森提出，不仅有信念自信，还有知觉自信，即作为知觉经验方面的自信，使我们能够解释，例如，我们越来越自信体验一个接近的人形，同时随着观看距离的缩小告诉我们自己，“看起来这可能是艾萨克”，“看起来这可能是艾萨克”，“看起来这几乎可以肯定是艾萨克。” 我首先介绍我的胡塞尔帐户，重点是实现的概念，以及知觉体验的内容是实现条件的想法。然后我证明这个帐户可以用 PC 来补充。最后，我将重点放在感性自我辩护的思想上，将感性自信辩论从其对感性自信和信念自信之间的关系的突出关注转移，并提出一个论点，证明存在感性自信。