当前位置: X-MOL 学术European Journal of Philosophy › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
A new theory of absence experience
European Journal of Philosophy ( IF 0.7 ) Pub Date : 2020-08-02 , DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12577
Laura Gow 1
Affiliation  

Ordering your morning coffee and then realising that your wallet is missing from your bag triggers an experience of the absence of your wallet. Familiar cases like this one provide good evidence for the idea that we frequently experience absences. According to one popular view, we experience absences by perceiving them. I argue that there are a number of problems with the perceptual view, and propose an alternative, cognitive account. Now, a cognitive account of absence experience has already been widely discussed and unequivocally rejected by participants in the debate. However, arguments against it depend upon the important, yet mistaken assumption that cognitive accounts must appeal to beliefs or judgements. I argue that the phenomenology involved in absence experience is not that associated with belief or judgement, but is instead an intellectual seeming. This renders my account immune to the objections that have been made against the existing cognitive view.

中文翻译:

缺勤经历的新理论

订购早晨咖啡,然后意识到皮包中缺少钱包,就会触发缺少钱包的体验。像这样的熟悉案例为我们经常经历缺勤的想法提供了很好的证据。根据一种流行的观点,我们通过感知它们来体验缺失。我认为感性观点存在许多问题,并提出了另一种认知方法帐户。现在,关于缺勤经历的认知解释已被广泛讨论,并被辩论的参与者明确拒绝。但是,反对它的观点取决于一个重要但错误的假设,即认知解释必须诉诸于信念或判断。我认为,缺勤经历中涉及的现象学与信念或判断无关,而是一种理智的表象。这使我的陈述不受针对现有认知观点提出的异议的影响。
更新日期:2020-08-02
down
wechat
bug