The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) greatly expanded audit committees' oversight responsibilities by requiring that they preapprove all non‐prohibited non‐audit services (NAS). Using data from 2003 to 2011, we find that tax NAS are significantly lower when accounting financial experts (ACT‐FEs) serve on the audit committee, suggesting that ACT‐FEs consider auditor independence risk, perceived and/or real, more than other members, including supervisory experts, to the point of not accepting any tax NAS, not even compliance. However, in firms with higher ex ante litigation risk, ACT‐FEs approve relatively more tax NAS than other members, suggesting that they accept the costs of a perceived lack of auditor independence from tax NAS in return for the potential benefits of increased financial reporting quality arising from tax NAS. Our analysis by subperiod (2003–2006 vs. 2007–2011) shows that this result is significant only in the second period. ACT‐FEs' differential evaluation of the trade‐off between the benefits and costs of joint audit and tax NAS provision between the two periods suggests the need for additional research in later post‐SOX years.

中文翻译：

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审计委员会的财务专业知识，诉讼风险和审计师提供的税务服务*

《萨班斯法案》（SOX）要求审计委员会预先批准所有非禁止性非审计服务（NAS），从而大大扩展了审计委员会的监督职责。使用2003年至2011年的数据，我们发现，当会计金融专家（ACT-FE）担任审计委员会成员时，税收NAS显着降低，这表明ACT-FE与其他成员相比，对审计师独立性风险的认识和/或真实性更高。 ，包括监管专家，以至于不接受任何意见对NAS征税，甚至不遵守法规。但是，在事前风险较高的公司中，ACT‐FE与其他成员相比，相对而言，NAS所拥有的税收NAS相对更多，这表明他们接受认为审计师没有税收NAS的独立性所付出的代价，以换取财务报告质量提高的潜在好处。由税金NAS产生。我们对子时期（2003-2006年与2007-2011年）的分析表明，该结果仅在第二阶段才有意义。ACT‐FE对这两个时期之间联合审计和NAS NAS计提的收益与成本之间的折衷进行的差异评估表明，在SOX后的几年中需要进行进一步的研究。