By applying a growth model of an occupational choice between being a worker and being a criminal, an institutional Kuznets curve is produced. Using the Gini coefficient derived from the model, we investigate how institutional quality affects wealth inequality across agents. In the case of a relatively higher capital share, an institutional Kuznets curve can emerge. In this case, an improvement in institutional quality decreases the possibility of being stolen but increases the amount of wealth stolen. In the early stage of economic development, since the latter effect dominates the former, inequality widens as institutional quality improves. In contrast, since the converse is true in the late stage, inequality shrinks once institutions have sufficiently matured. In the case of a lower capital share, an institutional Kuznets curve cannot emerge. In this case, inequality monotonically shrinks as institutional quality improves. Furthermore, we present government policies that reduce inequality and achieve the first-best outcome.

通过应用在工人和罪犯之间的职业选择增长模型，可以产生制度性的库兹涅茨曲线。使用从模型得出的基尼系数，我们研究了制度质量如何影响跨主体的财富不平等。在较高的资本份额的情况下，会出现制度性的库兹涅茨曲线。在这种情况下，机构质量的提高减少了被盗的可能性，但增加了被盗财富的数量。在经济发展的早期阶段，由于后一种效应支配着前者，因此，不平等随着制度质量的提高而扩大。相比之下，由于相反的情况在后期才是正确的，因此一旦制度充分成熟，不平等就会缩小。在资本份额较低的情况下，制度性的库兹涅茨曲线就不会出现。在这种情况下，不平等随着制度质量的提高而单调缩小。此外，我们提出了减少不平等并取得最佳结果的政府政策。