We study a variation of the duopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Firms limited by their capacity of production engage in a two stage game. In the first stage they commit to levels of production not exceeding their capacities which are then made common knowledge. In the second stage after production has taken place firms simultane- ously compete in prices. Solution of this sequential game shows that the unique Cournot equilibrium outcome as in Kreps and Scheinkman is not always guaranteed. However the Cournot outcome is still robust in the sense that given sufficiently large capacities this equilibrium holds. If capacities are sufficiently small, firms decide to produce at their full capacity and set a price which clears the market at the given level of output.

我们研究了由Kreps和Scheinkman（1983）提出的双头垄断模型的变体。受生产能力限制的公司进行两阶段博弈。在第一阶段，他们致力于生产水平不超过其能力的水平，然后使这些水平成为常识。在生产开始后的第二阶段，企业同时进行价格竞争。此顺序博弈的解决方案表明，并不总是保证像Kreps和Scheinkman那样独特的古诺均衡结果。然而，在给定足够大的容量的情况下，这种平衡仍然成立，从某种意义上说，古诺结局仍然是稳健的。如果生产能力足够小，则企业决定以其全部生产能力生产，并设定一个价格，以给定的产出水平清理市场。