Import regulations are globally the most prevalent form of intervention in international trade. The regulations should, under rules of the WTO, protect consumers and the environment but can be used to protect producers. We investigate the ambiguity of intent of the regulations. We set out a model that when applied empirically suggests, as a benchmark estimate, equal divide between social benefit and producer protection. Inefficiency and distributional effects of the regulations are consistent with producer-protecting trade policy. Country diversity in use of regulations supplements our estimates in suggesting presence of producer-protecting intent. We look at how WTO procedures have allowed producer protection in the guise of social benefit.

进口法规是全球最普遍的国际贸易干预形式。根据世贸组织的规则，这些规定应该保护消费者和环境，但也可以用来保护生产者。我们调查了法规意图的模糊性。我们提出了一个模型，当根据经验应用该模型时，作为基准估计，社会福利和生产者保护之间的等分。法规的低效率和分配效应与保护生产者的贸易政策是一致的。使用法规的国家多样性补充了我们的估计，表明存在保护生产者的意图。我们研究了 WTO 程序如何允许以社会利益为幌子对生产者进行保护。