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Manufacturer's encroachment strategy with substitutable green products
International Journal of Production Economics ( IF 9.8 ) Pub Date : 2021-03-11 , DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108102
Jin Li , Zening Hu , Victor Shi , Qian Wang

This paper investigates a dual-channel supply chain where a manufacturer sells substitutable green products to its downstream subsidiary as well as an independent retailer. Most research in the literature assumes centralized encroachment, where the manufacturer makes all decisions for the subsidiary. In this paper, we make a major contribution by considering decentralized encroachment, a business practice where the subsidiary decides on pricing and/or quantity to maximize its own profit. We make another contribution by considering competition and consumer's green awareness. Our major findings are as follows. First, compared with centralized encroachment, decentralized encroachment is more beneficial to the manufacturer, but it makes the retailer worse off. Second, a profit-sharing contract can be employed between the manufacturer and its downstream subsidiary so that the both can benefit from the decentralized encroachment strategy. Third, under either centralized or decentralized encroachment, consumer's higher green awareness always benefits the manufacturer as well as the retailer. As product substitutability increases, the manufacturer will always benefit while the retailer can benefit only when the direct selling cost exceeds a threshold. Fourth, the manufacturer's decentralized encroachment can also improve the environmental performance and social welfare for the supply chain. Finally, we conduct numerical experiments to further illustrate our analytical findings and gain more managerial insights.



中文翻译:

制造商对绿色产品的替代策略

本文研究了双渠道供应链,其中制造商向其下游子公司以及独立零售商出售可替代的绿色产品。文献中的大多数研究都假设集中入侵,制造商在此为子公司做出所有决策。在本文中,我们通过考虑分散式侵占做出了重大贡献,这种分散经营是子公司决定定价和/或数量以实现自身利润最大化的一种商业惯例。我们通过考虑竞争和消费者的绿色意识做出另一贡献。我们的主要发现如下。首先,与集中式侵占相比,分散式侵占对制造商更有利,但会使零售商的境况恶化。第二,制造商与其下游子公司之间可以签订利润分成合同,以便双方都可以从分散式侵占策略中受益。第三,在集中式或分散式侵占下,消费者较高的绿色意识始终使制造商和零售商都受益。随着产品替代性的提高,制造商将永远受益,而零售商只有在直销成本超过阈值时才能受益。第四,制造商的权力下放也可以改善供应链的环境绩效和社会福利。最后,我们进行数值实验以进一步说明我们的分析结果并获得更多的管理见解。在集中式或分散式侵占下,消费者较高的绿色意识始终使制造商和零售商都受益。随着产品替代性的提高,制造商将永远受益,而零售商只有在直销成本超过阈值时才能受益。第四,制造商的权力下放也可以改善供应链的环境绩效和社会福利。最后,我们进行数值实验以进一步说明我们的分析结果并获得更多的管理见解。在集中式或分散式侵占下,消费者较高的绿色意识始终使制造商和零售商都受益。随着产品替代性的提高,制造商将永远受益,而零售商只有在直销成本超过阈值时才能受益。第四,制造商的权力下放也可以改善供应链的环境绩效和社会福利。最后,我们进行数值实验以进一步说明我们的分析结果并获得更多的管理见解。制造商将永远受益,而零售商只有在直销成本超过阈值时才能受益。第四,制造商的权力下放也可以改善供应链的环境绩效和社会福利。最后,我们进行数值实验以进一步说明我们的分析结果并获得更多的管理见解。制造商将永远受益,而零售商只有在直销成本超过阈值时才能受益。第四,制造商的权力下放也可以改善供应链的环境绩效和社会福利。最后,我们进行数值实验以进一步说明我们的分析结果并获得更多的管理见解。

更新日期:2021-03-16
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